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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. 
USERY: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EQUAL PAY ACT 
AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 
In 1974 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) 1 to extend coverage to most nonsupervisory federal, state, 
and local government employees. Governmental employers be-
came subject to 'the FLSA minimum wage and maximum hours 
provisions and to the Equal Pay Act (EPA)2 which was enacted 
separately in 1963 but was incorporated into the F:LSA. The 1974 
Amendments also extended the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (ADEA)3 to cover governmental employees. 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 4 the Supreme Court 
invalidated the application of the FLSA minimum wage and 
maximum hours provisions to certain essential state government 
activities as an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty. 
This article will explore the implications of that decision with 
respect to the application of the EPA and the ADEA to state and 
local governments. 
Pait I contains a brief discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and Amendments. Part II discusses National League with refer-
ence to traditional commerce clause interpretation. Part III 
analyzes the difficulties of applying the decision, particularly the 
problem of defining the essential state functions immunized by the 
tenth amendment from federal regulation. It is suggested that Na-
tional League should be interpreted as requiring a balancing of the 
federal interest and the degree of federal intrusion against the state 
claim to immunity. While Part IV explains the background of the 
EPA and the ADEA, Part V discusses the effect of the National 
League decision on the application of the EPA and the ADEA to 
the states. 
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Fair Labor St'andards 
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 [hereinafter cited as 1974 
Amendments]. 
2 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1970). 
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55. The ADEA incorporates the 
enforcement provisions of§ 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 626 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
See note 9 infra. 
4 426 u .s. 833 (I 976). 
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I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: BACKGROUND 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,5 enacted pursuant to the 
commerce clause, was based, in part, on a congressional determi-
nation that "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and 
general well-being of workers" burden interstate commerce, pro-
voke labor disputes, and constitute an unfair method of competi-
tion.6 The Act was intended to eliminate substandard labor condi-
tions "as rapidly as practicable ... without substantially curtailing 
employment or earning power. " 7 The FLSA prescribed two major 
fair labor standards: a minimum wage8 and an overtime rate for 
work in excess of a forty-hour week. 9 In 1963 the Equal Pay Act 
added an additional fair labor standard requiring equal pay for 
equal work. 10 
Although the FLSA originally applied only to workers engaged 
in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate 
commerce, the coverage of the Act has been expanded by a series 
of amendments. The 1961 Amendments significantly broadened the 
scope of the FLSA by introducing the "enterprise" concept of 
coverage .11 The purpose of this extension wa~ to reach all 
employees of an enterprise which has any employees engaged in 
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The motive, purpose, and scope of the 
original Act were construed, and its constitutionality upheld, in United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941), and Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942). See also Powell v. 
United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 
U.S. 564 (1943); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942). 
6 FLSA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970). 
7 FLSA § 2(b), 29 U .S.C. § 202(b) (1970). 
6 FLSA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This section incorporates the Equal 
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). 
9 FLSA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
Section 16(a) of the FLSA, 29 U .S.C. § 216 (1970), provides criminal penalties for willful 
violation of the Act. A private cause of action is authorized in § 16(b), 29 U .S.C. § 216(b) 
(Supp. V 1975), against any employer (including a public agency) in any federal or state 
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees to recover withheld compen-
sation and an additional equal amount in liquidated damages. However, a class action on 
behalf of other employees similarly situated requires the written consent of each employee 
joined as a party plaintiff. The right to file a private action terminates upon the filing of 
proceedings under § 217 by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin any further delay in the 
payment of withheld compensation owed to the employee. 
Section 16(c), 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. V 1975), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to 
supervise settlements and to bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to 
recover withheld wages and liquidated damages. The private right of action provided in § 
16(b) terminates upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary. 
Section 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970), grants jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the Act to the 
federal district courts. 
10 See part IV. A. infra. 
11 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1%1, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (amending 
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970)). The enterprise concept increased the number of employees 
protected without increasing the number of employers subject to the Act. 
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interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 
In 1966 the FLSA was extended to state and local government 
workers employed in hospitals and related health care institutions, 
special schools and educational institutions, and local transit oper-
ations.12 The 1974 Amendments extended coverage to nearly all 
federal, state, and local government employees. 13 The original 
Act's exemption for executive, administrative, and professional 
employees was retained, 14 and additional exemptions were estab-
lished for elected officials and their immediate staffs. 15 The legisla-
tive history of the 1974 Amendments reflected a policy not only of 
regulating commerce, but also of assuming an affirmative federal 
responsibility to increase the minimum wage of all public sector 
employees. 16 
The enterprise concept and the limited 1966 extension of cover-
age to government employees were upheld as constitutional under 
the power of the federal commerce clause in Maryland v. Wirtz. 17 
Using traditional commerce clause analysis, 18 the Court held that 
Congress had a rational basis for the regulation of enterprises 
involved in interstate commerce because it could find that sub-
standard wages and hours have a substantial, disruptive effect on 
interstate commerce. 19 The Court rejected the challenge that the 
12 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (amending 
29 U .S.C. § 203(1970)). Section 3(d) was amended to include a .state or political subdivision 
within the definition of "employer;" § 3(r) was amended to include these activities within 
the definition of "enterprise;" and § 3(s) was amended to make it clear that these state 
operations qualify as an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce." 
13 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 5~ (amending 
29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)). "Employer" was redefined to include a public agency in§ 3(d); the 
definitions of "enterprise" and "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce" in § 3(r) and (s) were amended to include the activities of a public 
agency; "public agency" was defined to include the government of a state or any interstate 
governmental agency in § 3(x). 
14 FLSA § 13(a)(l), 29 U .S.C. § 213(a)(l) (1970). 
1
• FLSA § 3(e)(2)(C}, 29 U .S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (Supp,. V 1975). 
16 H.R. REP. No. 913. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9. revrinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 2811, 2817-19. As a means of enforcing the amended Act, Congress specifically 
authorized a private cause of action against state and local government employe1•s. 2'J 
U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1975). This explicit authorization of a private "16(b)" action 
against government employers was the legislative response to the decision in Employees v. 
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), which held that there was no 
clear expression of congressional intent in the FLSA to deprive states of their eleventh 
amendment immunity to suit. H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, 45, reprinted in 
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2850, 2853. The decision in Employees implied 
that a clear expression of congressional intent to override state immunity to suit would 
suffice to subject the states to suit under thj! FLSA. 41 I U.S. at 284-85. 
17 392 U.S. 183 ( 1968). The Court in National League overruled the Wirtz holding that the 
1966 Amendments were constitutional as applied to the states. 426 U.S. at 840, 853-54. 
18 See notes 29-39 and accompanying text infra. 
19 392 U.S. at 189-92. The substantial effect on interstate commerce rested alternatively 
on (I) the congressional finding that substandard wages and excessive hours gives the 
employer an unfair competitive advantage, or (2).the congressional finding that substandard 
labor conditions lead to labor disputes. which disrupt the free flow of goods. Both findings 
were deemed to have a rational basis, thus exhausting the scope of judicial review. 
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Amendments impermissibly interfere with state sovereignty. 20 Ac-
cording to the Wirtz Court, the Act requires only that the state 
employer be bound by the same restrictions that bind a wide range 
of private employers whose activities affect interstate commerce. 
As a. valid regulation of interstate commerce, the 1966 Amend-
ments affect state and private employers equally so that the federal 
interest cannot be outweighed by a state claim of sovereign immu-
nity. 
II. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 21 a five-to-four decision 
with Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, 22 the Supreme 
Court rejected the "far reaching implications" of Maryland v. 
Wirtz. 23 The Court held that insofar as the 1974 FLSA Amend-
ments "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions, they are not within the authority granted Congress" under 
the commerce clause. 24 In the Court's view, the power to deter-
mine the wages and hours of employees performing governmental 
functions is an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty. " 25 Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that the 1974 Amendments operate di-
rectly on "the States qua States," displacing state policy choices 
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of gov-
ernmental services, and substantially restructuring "traditional 
ways in which the local governments have arranged their af-
fairs. "26 Where the states exercise "functions essential to separate 
•
0 Id. at 195-96. According to Wirtz, there is a rational basis for a congressional finding 
that these state-operated schools and hospitals are sufficiently related to interstate com-
merce because either (I) such institlftions are major users of interstate goods, or (2) the labor 
disputes in these governmental agencies will disrupt interstate commerce. The state claim of 
sovereign immunity was upheld by the National League majority in the context of the 1974 
FLSA Amendments. See part II. A. infra. 
21 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing 
National League of Cities. 11 GA. L. REV. 35 (1976); Percy, National League of Cities v. 
Usery: The Tenth Amendment ls Alive and Doing Well, 51 TuL. L. REV. 95 (1976). 
22 Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun joined Justice Rehnquist in the major-
ity opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan filed a 
dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall, and Justice Stevens filed a 
separate dissent. 
23 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840, 853-54 (1976). 
•• Id. at 852. This summary of the holding by the Court is not wholly consistent with the 
majority's analysis of the Amendments as fully within the grant of legislative authority under 
the commerce clause, but nevertheless invalid as offending a separate constitutional limita-
tion expressed in the tenth amendment. There is a certain conceptual confusion in the 
opinion as a result of the majority's failure to precisely define the reach of the commerce 
power and the nature of the limit on commerce clause regulations which directly affect state 
and local governments. See part II. A. infra. 
25 Id. at 845. 
26 ld. at 847-49. 
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and independent existence, " 27 the tenth amendment was held to 
operate as an "express declaration" of a "constitutional barrier" 28 
against interference by the federal government. 
A. The Tenth Amendment As A Limitation 
On the Commerce Power 
The reasoning in National League differs significantly from prior 
cases interpreting the "plenary" scope of the commerce clause and 
the limited nature of judicial review over exercises of this power. 29 
According to the traditional interpretation of the commerce clause, 
Congress may statutorily declare that certain activities have a 
sufficiently substantial effect upon interstate commerce to justify 
federal regulation. Judicial review is then limited to three ques-
tions: first, whether there is a rational basis for the congressional 
finding that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce; second, whether the selected means of regulation are 
reasonably related to the legislative objective; and finally, whether 
27 Id. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Smith. 221 U.S. 559. 580 (1911). quoting Lane County v. 
Oregon. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71. 76 (1869). 
28 /d. at 841-42. 
29 In United States v. Darby.312 U.S. 100 ( 1941). the Court upheld the original Fair Labor 
Standards Act against the challenge that it impermissibly interfered with the authority of the 
states. reserved to them by the tenth amendment. to control the conditions of production. 
The Court held that Congress could regulate intrastate activities where they have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. This authority may be implemented by a wide choice of 
appropriate means. provided that the object of the regulation is sufficiently related to 
interstate commerce. Faced with a congressional determination that a specific subject of 
regulation affects commerce. "the only function of courts is to determine whether the 
particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the federal powers ... Id. at 
120-21. 
The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel. Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). upheld 
the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court concluded that 
Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected 
commerce and that the means chosen to eliminate the obstruction were appropriate and 
reasonably adapted to a permitted end. In Katzenbach v. McClung. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). the 
Court deferred to a congressional finding that discrimination in restaurants inhibited in-
terstate commerce. Justice Clark articulated the two-part inquiry before the Court: 
[T]he mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to 
affect commerce does not· preclude further examination by this Court. But where 
we find that the legislators. in light of the facts and testimony before them. have a 
rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of 
commerce. our investigation is at an end. The only remaining question ... is 
whether the particular restaurant either serves or offers to serve interstate travelers 
or serves food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce. 
Id. at 303-04. 
For other examples of the rational basis analysis of commerce clause regulations. see 
Maryland v. Wirtz. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). discussed at notes 17-20 and accompanying text 
;mpra; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co .. 317 U.S. 564 (1943); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling 
Co. v. Hall. 317 U.S. 88 (1942): Kirshbaum Co. v. Walling. 316 U.S. 517 (1942); Oklahoma 
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co .. 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB. 303 
U.S. 453 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp .. 301 U.S. I (1937); Gibbons v. 
Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824)._See also note 36 infra. 
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the affected party or business is properly within the regulated 
class. 30 
The majority opinion in National League evaded a "rational 
basis" analysis of the 1974 FLSA Amendments by interposing the 
tenth amendment as an express "affirmative limitation" which 
may restrict the exercise of power otherwise expressly delegated to 
Congress. 31 This constitutional limitation is triggered, in the 
Court's view, when Congress seeks to directly regulate the ac-
tivities of the states as employers. 32 Accordingly, the 1974 FLSA 
Amendments were invalid not because Congress lacked affirmative 
authority to reach state employers under the commerce clause, but 
30 The third inquiry. which focuses on the application of the statute in the particular case 
before the Court, will not lead to invalidation of the regulation where the complainant's 
impact on interstate commerce is individually trivial or remote if the class is rationally 
defined and the aggregate effect of like persons similarly situated is substantial. Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 127-28 (1942). 
31 426 U.S. at 841. Until the late l930's, the tenth amendment had been interpreted as 
reserving to the states the exclusive regulation of certain "local" concerns-i.e., productive 
industries (agriculture. mining. and manufacuturing) and employment conditions prior to 
any interstate movement. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. 
Butler. 297 U.S. I (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). This use of'the tenth 
amendment to support the exclusive right of the states to regulate certain private activity 
was rejected as a limitation on the federal commerce power in United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 116-17. 123 (1941). The National League Court used the tenth amendment not to 
demarcate an area of commerce which the states alone may control. but to limit federal 
regulations directly affecting the state itself as an employer. 426 U.S. at 841. 
32 The majority opinion does not clearly define the source or scope of the "constitutional 
barrier" against this exercise of congressional authority. At one point. however, it referred 
to the "established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity consistently 
recognized in a long series of our cases." 426 U.S. at 837. This doctrine is not explicitly 
based on the text of the Constitution, but was developed by judicial implication. See notes 
60-73 and accompanying text infra. The majority opinion in National League also referred to 
"limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty" imposed by "our federal 
system of government." Id. at 842. The Court apparently found an affirmative declaration of 
this federalism limitation in the tenth amendment, and applied it, in a manner similar to the 
limitations of the fifth and sixth amendment, to restrict the exercise. of delegated federal 
powers. 
In his dissenting opinion, Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), Justice Rehnquist 
stated: · 
[A]n individual who attacks an Act of Congress on the ground that it is not within 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause asserts only a claim of lack of 
legislative power .... [T]his individual's claim is ordinarily very difficult to sus-
tain. But an individual who attacks an Act of Congress, justified under the Com-
merce Clause, on the ground that it infringes his rights under, say, the First or Fifth 
Amendment, is asserting an affirmative constitutional defense of his own, one 
which can limit the exercise of power whicb is otherwise expressly delegated to 
Congress. That the latter claim is of greater force, and may succeed when the 
former will fail, is well established .... 
. . . [In Fry] the State is not simply asserting an absence of congressional 
legislative authority, but rather is asserting an affirmative constitutional right, 
inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally asserted 
authority. Whether such a claim on the part of a State should prevail against 
congressional authority is quite a different question, but it is surely no answer to 
the claim to say that a "state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been 
authorized than can an individual." 
Id. at 552-53, quoting in part United States v. California, 297 U.S. I 75, 185 (1936) (emphasis 
added). 
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because the effect of the regulatio.ns impaired the states' "ability to 
function effectively within a federal system. " 33 According to the 
National League Court, the state employer, as a "coordinate ele-
ment" in the federal system, may not be regulated in the same 
manner as a private employer.34 
The National League interpretation of the tenth amendment as a 
functional limitation on the exercise of the commerce power is a 
departure from the traditional understanding of this amendment 
literally applicable only to powers not delegated to the federal 
govemment. 35 The Court has frequently refused to construe it as a 
limitation upon the exercise of a specifically granted power, even 
when states have been directly affected by a federal regulation. 36 
In responding to a challenge to the original Fair Labor Standards 
Act, Justice Stone declared that the tenth amendment "states but a 
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. " 37 This 
now-familiar pronouncement was qualified in the majority opinion 
in Fry v. United States, 38 upholding the application of federal wage 
controls to the states: 
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not 
been surrendered," ... it is not without significance. The 
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that 
33 426 U.S. at 852, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7. 
34 426 U.S. at 849. 
35 U.S. CoNST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Consitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people." 
36 See, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958) (California statute 
requiring approval by PUC of carrier rates for public property held unconstitutional in view 
of comprehensive federal government procurement policy); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 
553 (1957) (national policy of collective bargaining incorporated in the Railway Labor Act 
supersedes a state's right to control employment relations of a state-owned railroad); United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). See notes 68-70 and accompanying text infra; 
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (state tax 
immunity narrowly read as inapplicable to federal right to levy customs duties on state 
imports pursuant to the commerce power); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 
U.S. 405 (1925) (authority of the United States to remove obstructions to interstate com-
merce by enjoining withdrawal of water from Lake Michigan held superior to the city's need 
to provide sewage disposal for its inhabitants); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 
(1913). Accord, Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F.2d 671 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1973) (freeze order 
issued under economic stabilization order did not unconstitutionally infringe a state's right to 
raise revenue for legitimate state ends); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970) (upheld 1966 FLSA Amendments against a challenge based on 
the eleventh amendment immunity of a state to suit in federal courts). See also Case v. 
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), and United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1%1) (federal 
exercise of war power overrides state claim of tenth amendment immunity); Parden v. 
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (by operating a railroad in interstate commerce, a state 
waives its eleventh amendment immunity to suit under federal commerce clause regula-
tions); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S 379 (1%3) (power to establish inferior 
courts and the power to grant patents upheld against a tenth amendment claim); Oklahoma 
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (federal spending power construed 
to outweigh sovereign state interest). 
37 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
38 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
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Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the 
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a 
federal system.39 
The National League majority relied upon this language in support 
of the view that federal intrusion into areas of state sovereignty 
affronts a specific constitutional prohibition. 40 
Justice Brennan, who was joined in his dissent by Justices White 
and Marshall, criticized the interposition of the tenth amendment 
as an affirmative restriction on the exercise of the commerce 
power.41 In the dissenters' view, the tenth amendment offers no 
justification for treating states and private parties differently where 
federal commerce regulations are involved; if a regulation is con-
stitutional, then it extends equally to both. 42 Justice Brennan con-
tended that the majority opinion departed from precedent by in-
venting an express state sovereignty limitation on the commerce 
power and by extending the scope of judicial review of commerce 
clause regulation. 43 Instead of applying the rational basis test to 
federal commerce clause legislation, the National League Court 
chose to invoke the tenth amendment to correct what it regarded as 
an imbalance in the federal system. Implicit in the decision is a 
more active role for the federal judiciary as arbiter of the appropri-
ate line between federal regulation and state governmental immu-
nity. 44 
39 Id. at 547 n.7. Whatever significance the tenth amendment has under this view. it was 
not sufficient to invalidate the regulations at issue in Fry. See notes 86-91 and accompanying 
text infra. 
40 426 U.S. at 842-43. 
41 Justice Brennan stated. "[T]here is no restraint based on state sovereignty requiring or 
permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution; our decisions over 
the last century and a half have explicitly rejected the existence of any such restraint on the 
commerce power." Id. at 858 (Brennan. J .. dissenting). The majority's construction of the 
tenth amendment was a "meaningless limitation," id. at 871, "an abstraction without 
substance. founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on precedent," id. at 860, 
and "a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disa-
gree," id. at 867. 
42 Id. at 861. 873 (Brennan, J .. dissenting). 
43 Id. at 875-76. Justice Brennan concluded: "It is unacceptable that the judicial process 
should be thought superior to the political process in this area. Under the Consitution the 
judiciary has no role beyond finding that Congress has not made an unreasonable legislative 
judgment respecting what is 'commerce.• " Id. at 876. 
44 The rational basis test commonly applied to federal exercises of the commerce power 
reflects an attitude of judicial deference to the legislative judgment in this area. Prior cases 
have suggested that Congress has special competence in resolving conflicts engendered by 
federal-state intergovernmental relations. Under this view, states should rely upon political 
restraints as a check on excessive federal power with the appropriate arena for resolving 
disputes as Congress rather than the Court. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 581-82 
(1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941); 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I. 78-80 (1936) (Stone. J .. dissenting)(" For the removal of 
unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the 
processes of democratic government."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 197 
(1824). See Wechsler. The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543, 558-60 
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B. The Effect of the FLSA Amendments 
As Applied to the States 
247 
The Supreme Court in National League also departed from 
traditional commerce clause analysis by not specifically consider-
ing the constitutionality of the FLSA Amendments as applied to 
the facts of the case. Instead, it engaged in a sweeping invalidation 
of the statute on federalism grounds, even though the cost of 
compliance and the extent of disruption in the delivery of govern-
ment services resulting from the 1974 Amendments were disputed 
issues. 45 The Court discussed particular allegations to support its 
result, but stated that an evaluation of the actual impact was not 
critical to its decision. 46 It was sufficient that the broad outline of 
the 1974 Amendments "appears likely" to substantially disrupt 
traditional state employment practices. 47 
It is questionable whether the 1974 FLSA Amendments were 
actually as broad or inflexible as Justice Rehnquist suggested. In 
upholding the 1966 FLSA Amendments, the court in Maryland v. 
Wirtz 48 held that wages and hours of state-operated schools and 
hospitals could be regulated, because the requisite connection be-
tween these institutions and interstate commerce could be estab-
lished by substantial use of interstate goods. 49 The Court noted 
(1954). Professor Wechsler argues that Congress, not the Court, is vested with ultimate 
authority for managing federalism. See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret 
Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 613-16 (1975); Freund, Umpiring 
the Federal System, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 561 ( 1954); Wechsler. Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I (1959). See also Tribe, lntergol'ernmental Im-
munities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Con-
trol'ersies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 694-96 (1976). Professor Tribe con-
tends that judicial inroads on state sovereignty, which are limited by the eleventh amend-
ment, should be distinguished from congressional power to abrogate state soverign immu-
nity, which is based on the "peculiar institutional competence of Congress in adjusting 
federal power relationships." Id. at 696. A similar argument is found in Nowak, The Scope 
of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Aciion Against State Go1•ernments and the 
History of the Elel'enth and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1441-42 
(1975). Professor Nowak argues that the politically unresponsive nature of the courts 
prevents effective recourse from a judicial decision limiting or expanding congressional 
power, and that the balancing required by federalism should be flexibly resolved by Con-
gress. 
45 Compare Complaints for Appellant National League and Appellant State of California. 
with Appellant's Motion to Affirm at 8, 19-25, and Brief for Appellee at 45-53, National 
League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The three-judge district court held no evidentiary hearing and 
made no factual findings. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss. however, the court 
commented that it was troubled by the substantial allegations of cost and disruption con-
tained in the plaintiffs' complaints. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 
828 (D.D.C. 1974). The degree of intrusion appears to be a critical factor in drawing the line 
between permissible and impermissible federal regulation of state activities. despite the fact 
that it was not adequately assessed in the Supreme Court's majority opinion. See notes 92-97 
and accompanying text infra. 
46 426 U.S. at 846, 85 I. 
41 Id. at 850. 
48 392 u .s. 183 (1968). 
49 Id. at 194. See note 20 supra. 
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that where the impact of interstate government operations on in-
terstate commerce is slight, extensive federal regulation is unjust-
ified. 50 Nevertheless, the Court declined to decide whether a par-
ticular hospital or school actually had employees engaged in com-
merce, thus qualifying under the Act, or whether those institutions 
fell within the Act's exemption for an "ultimate consumer" of 
interstate goods.51 These possible limitations on the applicability of 
the FLSA to state employees were not considered in National 
League. The Court also overlooked the possibility that existing 
statutory exceptions52 might mitigate the disruptive effects of the 
1974 Amendments. 
The broad invalidation of the Amendments without a specific 
analysis of their actual impact suggests that National League has 
potentially sweeping implications with respect to all aspects of the 
FLSA as applied to the states. Once a state function is found to be 
essential, the majority opinion protects state wage-hour decisions 
from any federal displacement, regardless of the degree of interfer-
ence. The Court's failure to analyze either the financial cost at 
stake or the extent of displacement of state policies makes it 
difficult to ascertain how the National League rationale affects 
other federal legislation involving state employment practices. 
III. AMBIGUITIES OF NATIONAL LEAGUE v. USERY 
A. The "Essential Government Function" Test 
The National League Court held that states have a sovereign 
right to operate "traditional governmental functions" free from 
50 Id. at 196 n.27. 
51 Id. at 200-01. The definition of "goods" in section 3(i) of the FLSA, 29 U .S.C. § 203 (i) 
(1970), specifically excludes goods after their delivery into the physical possession of the 
ultimate consumer. The importation of interstate goods by such a consumer will not qualify 
the importer as an enterprise engaged in commerce. The question whether particular 
governmental agencies have the requisite interstate connection to come within the Act's 
coverage is discussed in Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
1015 (1975). The court upheld application of the FLSA upon finding that some employees 
were engaged in activities in interstate commerce, thus qualifying the entire agency as an 
enterprise, and that the interstate connection was established where employees sell, handle, 
or use goods which have moved in interstate commerce. The dissent argued that the 
activities were purely local and should come within the "ultimate consumer" exception of 
29 u.s.c. § 203(i) (1970). 
52 See, in particular, the overtime exceptions for hospital employees and for police and 
firemen. FLSA § 7(j), (k), 29 U.S.C. § 207(j). (k), (Supp. V 1975); § 13(b)(20), 29 U.S.C. § 
213(b)(20) (Supp. V 1975). To provide additional tlexibility, the 1974 Amendments provided 
for phased-in compliance with the minimum wage over a four-year period for employees 
brought within the Act for the first time, FLSA § 6(b), 29 U .S.C. § 206 (Supp. V 1975). There 
are exceptions to the maximum hour regulations for seasonal employment in FLSA & 7(c), 
(d), 29. U.S.C. § 207(c), (d) (Supp. V 1975). Also FLSA § 13, 29 U.S.C § 213 (1970 & Supp. 
V 1975), contains numerous occupational exemptions, including the broad category of 
executive, administrative, or professional employees. FLSA § 14, 29 U .S.C. § 214 (Supp. V 
1975), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to approve employment of ieaniers, apprentices, 
students, and handicapped workers at less than the minimum wage "to the extent necessary 
in order to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment." 
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disruptive federal interference.53 The major difficulty with this 
holding is that the Court established a test which is inherently 
difficult to apply, while offering little guidance as to what standards 
should be embodied in the test. Relying on Fry v. United States, 54 
Justice Rehnquist suggested that the tenth amendment is violated 
when Congress attempts to "exercise power in a fashion that 
impairs the State's integrity or their ability to function effectively 
in a federal system. " 55 When the states are engaged in "functions 
essential to separate and independent existence, " 56 they are im-
munized from federal law under the commerce clause. The pro-
tected state enclave includes the "dual functions of administering 
the public law and furnishing public services," such as fire preven-
tion, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and 
recreation.57 Beyond these categories, cited by Justice Rehnquist 
as "typical" but not exhaustive, it is difficult to say what state 
activities are comprehended. The majority opinion does not distin-
guish "essential" from "traditional" state functions, and the inter-
changeable use of these terms becomes especially imprecise when 
applied to dynamically expanding governmental activity. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether state governmental activities 
are absolutely immunized from federal laws enacted pursuant to 
the commerce clause58 or are only exempted from regulations 
which displace the states' ability to "structure" employer-
employee relationships. The latter proposition requires drawing a 
second line, once an essential government function has been iden-
tified, between laws which interfere with the employment structure 
and those which do not. 59 Although a narrow reading of National 
53 426 U.S. at 852. 
54 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
55 426 U.S. at 843, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7. 
56 /d. at 845. The language is drawn from Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 
(1869) (power of taxation is an essential state function), quoted in Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 
559, 580 (191 I). Justice Rehnquist quotes the Coyle Court's illustration of an "essentially 
and peculiarly" state power - the power to locate and appropriate public funds for a state 
capitol. 
57 426 U.S. at 851 & n. 16. The opinion does not identify a common denominator for these 
activities: "While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved 
in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion 
of those governmental seivices which the States and their political subdivisions have 
traditionally afforded their citizens." Id. at 855. 
58 The Court declined to decide whether Congress may affect integral state governmental 
operations under the spending power or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 852 & 
n.17. Federal intrusion may be permissible pursuant to the war power, see discussion of 
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), at notes 99- JOO and accompanying text infra; or in the 
context of a national emergency, see discussions of United States v. Fry, 421 U.S. 542 
(1975), at notes 86-91 and accompanying text infra. 
59
.ln Elrod v. Bums, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976), the Court held that public employees, dis-
charged as a result of the political patronage system of state employment, were deprived of 
constitutional rights secured by the first and fourteenth amendments. Chief Justice Burger 
argued in dissent that the decision interfered with legislative and policy matters better left to 
the States and to Congress at the federal level. He suggested that National League's 
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League would mean only that Congress cannot interfere with the 
wages and hours of employees carrying on essential and traditional 
state activities, most of the decision's language is cast in broader 
terms. The decision invokes the tenth amendment as a constitu-
tional barrier against federal commerce clause regulations which 
disrupt the delivery of essential state services. It is unclear what 
federal legislation, other than wage-hour regulation, may be invali-
dated under this rationale. 
In support of the concept of an enclave of immune state ac-
tivities, Justice Rehnquist drew on precedents associated with the 
theory of implied intergovernmental tax immunity. 60 In attempting 
to limit the broad immunity of states from federal taxation, the 
Court had developed a distinction between a state's "governmen-
tal" activities, which enjoyed tax immunity, and its "proprietary" 
activities, which were subject to federal taxation. 61 Helvering v. 
Gerhardt 62 further restricted the states' reciprocal immunity, 
permitting it only where the function involved was "essential to the 
maintenance of a state government." 63 In New York v. United 
States, 64 which upheld a federal tax on the state's sale of its 
mineral waters, it was conceded that there was a limited area of 
tax-immune activities uniquely characteristic of the states, but the 
Court was divided in its analysis of the issue. 65 Nevertheless, the 
prohibition of federal "inroads on the powers of the States to manage their own affairs" 
should control the result in Elrod. Id. at 2690-91. 
60 Derived from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819). this theory supported intergovernmental tax immunity until the late 
1930's. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 
314 U.S. I (1941); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Helvering v. 
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931); 
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) I 13 (1871). See McCormack, Intergovernmental 
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485 (1973); Powell, The Waning of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1945); Powell, The Remnant of 
Tax Intergovernmental Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1945); Tribe, supra note 44. 
61 Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (state-operated street railway taxed); Ohio v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state liquor business taxed); South Carolina v. United 
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (same). 
62 304 U.S. 405 (1938). 
63 Id. at 417. If the activity could be carried on by a private enterprise, it did not qualify 
under Gerhardt as a function essential to the state as a governmental entity. The Gerhardt 
Court rejected the argument that the increased economic burden of federal taxation uncon-
stitutionally infringed upon state sovereignty: 
Even though, to some unascertainable extent, the tax deprives the states of the 
advantage of paying less than the standard rate for the services which they engage, 
it does not curtail any of those functions which have been thought hitherto to be 
essential to their continued existence as states. At most it may be said to increase 
somewhat the cost of the state governments .... 
Id. at 420. 
64 326 U.S. 572 (1946). 
65 Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Rutledge, announced the opinion of the Court; 
Rutledge also filed a separate concurrence. Justice Stone.joined by Justices Reed, Murphy, 
and Burton, wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, 
filed a dissenting opiniof!. 
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governmental-proprietary distinction was firmly rejected by a 
majority of the Court as an unworkable test. 66 
Even if the demarcation techniques of the intergovernmental tax 
immunity theory were agreed upon by the Court and capable of 
application, they were traditionally applied successfully only to 
exercises of the federal taxing power. Until National League, state 
claims to immunity from federal regulatory control under the 
commerce clause had not been accepted. 67 In United States v. 
California, 68 the leading case in this area prior to National League, 
a distinction was articulated between the federal taxing power, 
which is subject to a limited state immunity, and the federal com-
merce clause power, which is plenary. Upholding the application . 
of the statutory penalties of the Federal Safety Appliance Act to a 
state-operated railway, the Court rejected the state's argument that 
it was immune from federal regulation when acting in a sovereign 
capacity. 69 Furthermore, the Court considered the analogy of state 
immunity to federal taxation to be inappropriate where commerce 
clause regulations are involved as in this case: 
[We] look to the activities in which the states have traditionally 
engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the 
federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the 
plenary power to regulate Commerce. The state can no more 
deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress 
than can an individual. 70 
66 Justice Frankfurter dismissed the governmental-proprietary distinction as "untenable" 
and argued that the tax immunity should be limited to sources of revenue "uniquely capable 
of being earned only by a State." 326 U.S. at 582-83. Justice Stone, whose opinon was relied 
upon by the majority in National League, 426 U.S. at 843 & nn.13-14, also rejected the 
governmental-proprietary distinction, but he suggested that even nondiscriminatory taxes 
applied equally to private persons and the state may .unconstitutionally interfere with the 
state's performance of its sovereign functions. Justice Stone suggested, for example, that a 
nondiscriminatory property tax could not be applied to the state's capitol, its statehouse, its 
public school houses, or public parks. Id. at 587-88. This illustration is noted by Justice 
Rehnquist in the majority opinion in National League, 426 U.S. at 843. Justice Brennan, 
dissenting in National League, regarded New York v. United States. 326 U.S. 572 (1946), as 
inapposite, because it dealt with limitations applicable only to the federal taxing power and 
not to the commerce power, 426 U.S. at 863-64. Moreover, he argued that even the state's 
tax immunity was severely limited, in Justice Frankfurter's view, to taxes which discrimin-
ate against the states. Id. at 866 n.7. 
61 See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (overruled in National League): Parden v. 
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), and United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (all harmonized in National League); Case v. 
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (distinguished in National League). See note 36 supra. 
68 297 u .s. 175 (1936). 
69 The Court stated: 
The only question we need consider is whether the exercise of that power, in 
whatever capacity, must be in subordination to the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, which has been granted specifically to the national government. The 
sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of 
power to the federal government in the Constitution. 
Id. at 183-84. 
70 Id. at 185. 
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The Court relied upon the California analysis in Maryland v. 
Wirtz 11 in order to conclude that the 1966 FLSA Amendments 
permissibly subjected the states to the same restrictions applied to 
a wide range of private employers whose operations affect com-
merce. The Wirtz Court held that the federal government, pursuant 
to the delegated commerce power, "may override countervailing 
state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or 
'proprietary' in character. " 72 Provided that the law constitutes an 
otherwise valid regulation of commerce, the principle of California 
was held to be "controlling. " 73 
While it rejected the California distinction between limitations 
on the federal taxing power and those on the commerce power, 74 
the National League Court did not overrule California. Because 
state operation of a railroad was considered not to be within the 
immune sphere of integral state activities,75 the distinction be-
tween the reach of the federal taxing and commerce powers be-
came superfluous. 76 The Court construed the federal commerce 
power as limited by the same state sovereignty restraint tradition-
71 392 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1968). See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra. 
72 392 U.S. at 195. 
73 Id. at 198. The Court concluded: 
This Court has examined and will continue to examine federal statutes to determine 
whether there is a rational basis for regarding them as regulations of commerce 
among the States. But it will not carve up the commerce power to protect enter-
prises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce from private businesses, sim-
ply because those enterprises happen to be run by the States for the benefit of their 
citizens. 
Id. at 198-99. 
74 The majority opinion stated: "(W)e have reaffirmed today that the States as States 
stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the 
exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta from United States v. 
California simply wrong." 426 U.S. at 854-55, citing United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 
185, quoted in text accompanying note 70 supra. 
75 National League, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. The same reasoning is used by the National 
League majority to reconcile Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and California v. 
Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), both of which applied the California rule. Some contrary 
language appears in Parden, however, where the Court held that by adopting and ratifying 
the commerce clause which empowered Congress to regulate commerce, the states "neces-
sarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such 
regulation." 377 U.S. at 192. The state is subject to federal regulation equally with private 
persons if it engages in activity regulated by Congress and not within the sphere of "exclu-
sively" state activities. Id. at 196-97. See National League, 426 U.S. at 870 n.11 & 871 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
76 The distinction between the taxing and commerce powers was not "dicta" in the 
California opinion; in the face of the state's assertion that the railroad was a sovereign 
activity, the Court found that it was not necessary to decide whether the railroad was a 
sovereign activity or not because, in its view, even sovereign state activities must yield to 
valid regulations of interstate commerce. California, 297 U.S. at 183-84. 
Other precedents sustaining the federal regulatory power against state claims to immunity 
were also dismissed by the National League Court. The irreconcilable holding and" reason-
ing" in Wirtz were overruled. 426 U.S. at 840, 853-54. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), 
was distinguished as an exercise of the war power. Id. at 854 n. 18. 
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ally applied to the federal taxing power, 77 and it applied the inter-
governmental tax immunity precedents to support its result. 
Although cases prior to National League had sharply distin-
guished the federal taxing and commerce powers in terms of state 
immunity, the legitimacy of the distinction has not been carefully 
analyzed. Federal exercises of both powers may involve serious 
interferences with the institutional autonomy and fiscal integrity of 
the states and may present similar problems in reconciling compet-
ing interests of the states and the federal government. There are 
perhaps justifiable, even though unarticulated, grounds for the 
majority's assimilation of the implications for federalism involved 
in these two powers. The majority opinion, however, does not 
offer a principled analysis of its realignment of precedents. 
Further, even if the taxing and commerce powers should be simi-
larly construed in terms of their impact on state sovereignty, the 
Court did not satisfactorily explain why the controlling interpreta-
tion should be supplied by the intergovernmental tax immunity 
cases, which failed to develop any workable test for determining 
which state activities are properly subject to federal interference. 78 
The rational basis review used in the commerce clause precedents 
provides as justifiable an approach while recognizing the institu-
tional competence of Congress in resolving conflicts in the federal 
system. 79 
As an alternative to overruling Wirtz, the cities and states in 
National League argued that Wirtz might be limited to state ac-
tivities in competition with the private sector, such as schools and 
hospitals, and that a different rule could be developed for essential 
government functions uniquely performed by the state, such as 
77 The two immunities are held to be derived from a common source: 
Surely the federal power to tax is no less a delegated power than is the commerce 
power: both find their genesis in Art. I. § 8. Nor can characterizing the limitation 
recognized upon the federal taxing power as an "implied immunity" obscure the 
fact that this "immunity" is derived from the sovereignty of the States and the 
concomitant barriers which such sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary federal 
authority. 
426 U.S. at 843-44 n.14. 
78 See note 161 and accompanying text infra. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's use 
of the intergovernmental tax immunity analogy concluding: 
That no precedent justifies today's result is particularly clear from the awkward 
extension of the doctrine of state immunity from federal taxation-an imm_unity 
conclusively distinguished by Mr. Justice Stone in California, and an immunity that 
is "narrowly limited" because "the people of all the states have created the 
national government and are represented in Congress," Helvering v. Gerhardt 
... -to fashion a judicially enforceable restraint on Congress' exercise of the 
commerce power that the Court has time and again rejected as having no place in 
our constitutional jurisprudence. 
Id. at 869-70. 
79 See Tribe, supra note 44, at 700-13. 
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police and fire protection.80 Such a restriction of Wirtz would have 
raised difficult questions concerning which state activities are in 
competition with the private sector. Declining to use this criterion, 
the National League Court overruled Wirtz. Thus, activities car-
ried on competitively or concurrently by government and private 
parties may be drawn within the area of immunity, if performed by 
the state and qualifying as essential functions under National 
League, regardless of the state's competitive advantage in its free-
dom to pay substandard wages. 
National League does not offer functional standards for deter-
mining which state functions are immune; the "essential," "tradi-
tional," and "governmental" categories have been used inter-
changeably to refer to an undefined sphere which the Court will 
have to more clearly delineate. 81 The historical standard of what 
functions have "traditionally" been performed by states is in-
adequate in identifying those functions that are essential to the 
states' separate existence. In an era of dynamically expanding 
governmental activity, "essential" state functions should be de-
fined by flexible standards sensitive to shifting demands on state 
and local governments. Under the National League decision, how-
ever, the scope of protected state activities must be determined 
constitutionally by the courts, rather than politically by Con-
gress. 82 In view of the failure of the National League Court to 
provide criteria for identifying immune state functions, applying 
the essential function test will necessarily involve policy judgments 
which will vary with individual justice's views of what is "essen-
tial" or "traditional." 
B. An Ad Hoc Balancing Test? 
The National League majority mechanically defined state 
sovereign immunity in terms of the nature of the activity displaced 
by federal regulation without weighing the countervailing federal 
policy involved in the FLSA. Several factors suggest, however, 
•
0 Brief for Appellant National League at 18, 26, and Brief for Appellant State of Califor-
nia at 45-47, National League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The district court had also noted the 
possibility of limiting Wirtz in this respect. National League v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 
827 (D.D.C. 1974). 
81 The difficulty of ascertaining immune state functions was recognized by Justice Rehn-
quist in Fry v. United States: 
It is conceivable that the traditional distinction between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" activities might in some form prove useful in such line drawing. The 
distinction suggested in New York v. United States ... between activities tradi-
tionally undertaken by the State and other activities might also be of service, 
although it too was specifically rejected in California. 
421 U.S. 542,558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974). 
82 See notes 4;\-44 and accompanying text supra. 
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that the National League test may be more flexible than a literal 
reading of the majority opinion might indicate. 
The fifth vote required for a majority was supplied by Justice 
Blackmun,83 who, in a separate concurrence, stated that he joined 
the opinion of the Court only with the understanding that the Court 
was adopting a "balancing approach." In his view, state sovereign 
immunity yielded to a paramount federal power in areas where the 
federal interest is greater and where state compliance with imposed 
federal standards is essential. 84 A balancing process, through 
which state immunity can be overridden, modifies the idea that 
federal regulation cannot pierce the "constitutional barrier" sur-
rounding essential state functions. It is not clear, however, what 
standards would be used to identify a paramount federal interest. 85 
The strong federal policy expressed in the wage-hour regulations of 
the FLSA of eliminating substandard labor conditions and disrup-
tive labor disputes was apparently not a sufficiently important 
federal interest to displace state decisions as shown by the decision 
reached in National League. 
Support for a balancing test is also found in National League's 
approval of Fry v. United States. 86 The Court in Fry upheld the 
application of federal wage and salary controls to state employees 
pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.87 Unrestrained 
wage increases would have significantly affected interstate com-
merce and impaired the effectiveness of federal action to combat a 
nationwide economic problem. Holding that under the commerce 
clause Congress may regulate even purely intrastate activity where 
the aggregate impact of like conduct affects interstate commerce, 
the Court rejected the argument that the federal wage controls 
impermissibly interfered with sovereign state functions. The tenth 
amendment was held to prohibit only federal regulation which 
interferes with the states' "ability to function effectively in a fed-
eral system. " 88 
83 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J .• concurring). See note 22 supra. 
84 Id. Justice Blackmun cited only one specific example-environmental protection. 
85 Justice Brennan. in dissent. criticized Justice Blackmun's balancing approach as a 
"thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our system of 
government reserves to Congress." Id. at 876 (Brennan. J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 852-53. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in Fry calling for a reconsider-
ation of United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz. 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent is similar in structure and reasoning to his opinion 
for the Court in National League. Because Justice Rehnquist would have invalidated the Fry 
regulations on grounds similar to those articulated in National League, and because every 
other member of the National League majority approved the Fry result. the Fry case is an 
important key to the implications of the National League case. See notes 89-91 and 
accompanying text infra. 
87 Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1970). 
88 421 U.S. at 547-48. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra. 
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As construed in National League, 89 the result in Fry turned on 
three critical factors. First, the statute there was an emergency 
measure enacted to counter a national problem peculiarly suscep-
tible to a federal solution. Second, the federal interference was 
temporary and only mildly intrusive on state interests. Third, the 
purpose and effect of the regulation was to relieve rather than 
increase the fiscal burdens on the states. Both National League 
and Fry dealt with commerce clause wage regulations directed at 
the state as an employer. Although Fry upheld a federal ceiling on 
state salaries, while National League involved the imposition of a 
minimum floor, both infringed upon the same prerogative of the 
states to structure pay scales. 90 These cases, however, are distin-
guishable on the grounds of the federal interest involved and the 
degree of federal intrusion on state interests. Taking National 
League in conjunction with Fry, it becomes apparent that the tenth 
amendment argument is, as Blackmun understood it, a question of 
balancing rather than a rigid demarcation of a protected state 
enclave. Accordingly, a national problem, which requires a uni-
form federal solution, and which does not displace legitimate state 
choices or impose disruptive financial burdens, may foreclose the 
tenth amendment issue, as it did in Fry. 91 
Although the extent to which the National League Court consid-
ered the degree of federal intrusion is unclear,92 state financial 
burdens have usually been considered irrelevant where federal 
policy implementation is involved. 93 Although the majority opinion 
stated that resolution of the disputed cost issue is not critical to the 
decision,94 it concluded that the financial cost of the FLSA 
89 426 U.S. at 852-53. 
90 It is difficult to draw a legitimate constitutional distinction between the federal power to 
prohibit wage increases and the federal power to force them above a minimum level. 
91 421 U.S. at 548. 
92 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra. 
93 Oklahoma v. Guy F. "Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,528 (1941); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago 
v. United States, 266 U.S. 405,432 (1925); Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100, 104 (8th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970). See also the treatment of the increased economic 
burden of federal taxation in the United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469, 472 
(1958); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 483-86 (1939); Helvering v. 
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 420-21 (1938). 
In the context of eleventh amendment immunity from suit under the FLSA, the Court 
stated: 
Where employees in state institutions not conducted for profit have such a relation 
to interstate commerce that national policy, of which Congress is the keeper, 
indicates that their status should be raised, Congress can act. And when Congress 
does act, it may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States. 
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 41_1 U.S. 279, 284 (1973). But cf Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974), approving Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973) (cost to state of retroactive payments for improperly 
withheld welfare funds balanced against, and found to outweigh, benefit to recipient). 
94 426 U.S. at 846, 851. Justice Rehnquist stated that an "outline discussion" of the 
"general import" of the 1974 FLSA Amendments, ratherthan "particularized" assessments 
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Amendments amounted to a "significant impact. " 95 In addition, the 
Court predicted other adverse effects, such as the curtailment of 
governmental services and the substantial restructuring of work 
periods and existing employment practices.96 The Fry Court had 
suggested that some minimal threshold level of federal interference 
is tolerable, at least where reasonably related to a national problem 
requiring a federal solution. But the National League Court failed 
to analyze the precise impact of the FLSA Amendments, or even 
to consider such an inquiry necessary to its result leaving uncertain 
the quantum of federal interference necessary to trigger the tenth 
amendment.97 
A further factor supporting a more flexible reading of the Na-
tional League test is that the test applies only where an exercise 
of the commerce clause affronts state sovereignty. The Court 
expressed no view concerning whether the same result would be 
reached if Congress sought to interfere with state sovereign func-
tions pursuant to the spending power or section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment.98 In distinguishing Case v. Bowles, 99 the Court also 
refused to address the scope of the federal war power. 100 While the 
of actual impact, was all that was necessary to show an impermissible federal instrusion. He 
maintained that, even under the federal government's assessments, the states' ability to 
structure employment relations was significantly displaced. Id. at 851. 
95 Id. at 846. Based on a 1970 feasibility study by the Department of Labor, Congress 
predicted the impact of the 1974 Amendments to be "virtually non-existent" in view.of the 
overtime exemption for police and firemen, 29 U .S.C. § 207(j), (k) (Supp. V 1975). H.R. 
REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
281 I, 2838. See note 52 supra. Justice Brennan argued in his National League dissent that 
the appellants' allegations exaggerated and misapplied the Amendments. 426 U.S. at 874 
n.12. He further claimed tht the plurality's refusal to rely on the cost-of-compliance factor 
produced a broad rule capable of invalidating any federal regulation, however insignificant 
the cost. / d. at 874-75. 
96 426 U.S. at 846-52. 
97 The briefs of the appellants proposed that the decision be made in a commerce clause 
context but that the court use a stricter standard of review than the traditional rational basis 
test. Brief for Appellant National League at 46-47, 96-108, and Brief for Appellant State of 
California at 23-24, National League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Under this view, the tenth 
amendment, construed as a fundamental right, would increase the burden on the govern-
ment to justify the law by a compelling federal interest, analogous to the standard of judicial 
review of suspect classifications in equal protection cases. The National League majority 
opinion, however, pursued a different route to invalidation by avoiding the commerce clause 
altogether. The Court focused on the nature of the displaced state function, without specify-
ing what burden must be borne by a state challenging a federal regulation or what legitimate 
state interests can override the congressional judgment. 
98 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. For a discussion of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment see part 
V. B. infra. 
99 327 u .s. 92 (1946). 
100 426 U.S. at 854-55 n.18. The Court in Case upheld the application of the price 
restraints of the Emergency Price Control Act to the sale of timber by the state of Washing-
ton for the support of its public schools. The state argued that the federal war power did not 
extend to the state's exercise of ''essential government functions,'' such as raising revenue 
for the support of education. 327 U.S at IOI. The Court rejected this criterion as unwork-
able, citing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), and New York v. United States 
326 U.S 572 (1946). Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that Congress has adequate 
power to accomplish the full purpose of a delegated power including all appropriate means 
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specific holding in National League is limited to an invalidation of 
commerce clause legislation, the opinion offers no logical grounds 
for precluding the extension of its tenth amendment analysis to 
exercises of other delegated powers. If the tenth amendment is an 
affirmative constitutional limitation on the commerce power, it is 
not clear why it would not be an equally effective limitation where 
a different federal constitutional power is asserted. 
IV. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION 
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: BACKGROUND 
A. The Equal Pay Act 
The Equal Pay Act of 19631°1 forbids sex discrimination in the 
payment of wages to employees in an enterprise engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce. The EPA, 
enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, is based upon a congres-
sional finding that sex-based wage differentials have a substantial, 
adverse impact on interstate commerce. 102 Adding to the FLSA a 
fair labor standard requiring equal pay for equal work, 103 the EPA 
is broadly remedial. 104 The EPA employs the remedies and en-
plainly adapted to that end. Id. at 102. The Court considered the tenth amendment as not 
operating as a limitation upon the express or implied power granted to the federal govern-
ment. 
The Court in National League distinguished the war power involved in Case from the 
commerce clause power stating that to sustain state immunity in Case would " 'impair a 
prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment.' " 426 U.S. at 855 n.18, quoting 
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. at 102. Justice Brennan, dissenting in National League, argued 
that Case, not the New York analysis of intergovernmental tax immunity, was the proper 
precedent for the questions presented in National League. See notes 64-66 and accompany-
ing text supra. 
101 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970)). 29 U.S.C. § 
206(d)(I) (1970) provides: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, 
between employees on the 'basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to 
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor 
other than sex. . . . 
102 Section 2 of the Equal Pay Act of 1%3, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. 
103 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1970). 
10
• See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug 
Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Hodgson v. Square D 
Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. %7 (1972); Hodgson v. Miller 
Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972); Shultz v American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d 
356 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
398 U.S. 905 (1970); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'! Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1%9); 
Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for 
Women, 5 VAL. L. REV. 326 (1971); Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the 
Equal Pay Act 1963-70, 39 U. CINN. L. REV. 615 (1970). 
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forcement procedures of the FLSA 105 but is limited to the FLSA 
coverage of employees entitled to the federal minimum wage. 106 
The purpose of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 is similar to that of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 107 Although there is an 
overlap in coverage, Title VII was not intended to preempt the 
EPA, 108 which continues to provide a narrower remedy for sex-
based wage differentials. 109 The EPA is harmonious in purpose 
with Title VII and has been construed so as not to undermine the 
broader Act. 110 Title VII is not limited by the EPA's coverage, its 
definition of equal work, or its statutory exceptions. 111 Rather, it 
105 29 U .S.C. §§ 216-217 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 9 supra. By tying the Equal Pay 
Act to the FLSA, Congress intended to take advantage of the established enforcement 
procedures and existing interpretations of the FLSA. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., I st 
Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1%3] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 688. 
106 The extension of the coverage of FLSA effected by the FLSA Amendments of 1%6, 
Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830, and by the 1974 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 
55, applied equally to the EPA. 
107 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975)). Section 703(a), 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), provides that it shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's ... sex .... " 
108 Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) deals specifically with the 
relationship to the EPA; a wage differentiation authorized by the EPA will not be considered 
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's (EEOC) Sex Discrimination Guidelines state that the coverage of Title VII is 
broader than the EPA, which is limited by the reach of the FLSA. A defense based upon the 
EPA may be raised in a proceeding under Title VII, in which case the EEOC will give 
appropriate consideration to, but will not be bound by, the Department of Labor's interpre-
tation of the EPA. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1975). See Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp. 242 
(N .D. Cal. 1974); Herbert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating 
Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 449, 450 (1971); Kanowitz, Sex-Based 
Discrimination in American Law Ill: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 344 (1968); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 885 (1972). See also 
Larson, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in State and Local Government Employment: 
A Survey and Analysis, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 335, 345-46 (1973). 
10
• Sape & Hart, supra note 108, at 85 I. The EPA initially enjoyed more effective 
remedies than those provided for Title VII, but the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act 
have minimized the differences by providing more effective enforcement powers for the 
EEOC under§ 706, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 
Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1975)). 
uo E.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 905 (1970), where the court stated that the EPA and Title VII are "in pari materia," 
both serving the same fundamental purpose, with the result that the exceptions to the EPA 
should be broadly construed so as not to undermine Title VII. Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & 
Son, Inc., 51 I F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. 
ZIA Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1971); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 
719, 727 (5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'! Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 658-59 (5th Cir. 
1969). Kanowitz, supra note 108, at 350; Landau & Dunahoo, Sex Discrimination in 
Employment: A Survey of State and Federal Remedies, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 417, 497-99 
(1971). 
An example of the close interrelationship between the EPA and Title VII is provided in 
the recent Supreme Court decision in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U .S.L. W. 4031 (Dec. 
7, 1976). The Court stated that interpretations of the EPA are applicable to Title VII and 
further suggested that, in construing Title VII, the legislative history and intefPretive 
regulations of the EPA take precedence over more recent EEOC Guidelines interpreting 
Title VII. 
111 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1970); see note 101 supra. 
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establishes an independent statutory remedy 112 which covers more 
types of discrimination. 
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967113 prohibits 
employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from dis-
criminating on the basis of age against individuals between the ages 
of forty and sixty-five in matters of hiring, job retention, compen-
sation, and other terms and conditions or privileges of employ-
ment. The purpose of the Act is to promote the employment of 
older persons on the basis of their ability rather than age, to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment, and to assist 
employers and workers in dealing with the problems arising from 
the impact of age on employment. 114 Like the EPA, the ADEA was 
enacted pursuant to commerce clause authority and is based on 
legislative findings that arbitrary age discrimination "burdens 
commerce and the free flow of goods. " 115 The ADEA is enforced 
in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided 
in the FLSA. 116 
Although age discrimination was not prohibited in Title VII, 11 7 
the ADEA parallels Title VII in its fundamental purpose to ensure 
and promote employment without regard to arbitrary criteria. 
There are also a number of structural similarities between the two 
statutes. 118 Accordingly, the courts have used Title VII precedents 
to construe the provisions of the ADEA.11 9 
1 u H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 2137, 2154; Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Herbert & 
Reischel, supra note 108, at 450-51. 
113 Pub. L. No. 90.202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 
1975)). 
11
• 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). 
11
• 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1970). 
116 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 9 supra. Before suit can be brought, 
however, the statute requires that an attempt at voluntary compliance be made by the 
Secretary of Labor through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. 
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). See Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974). 
117 Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970), authorized the 
Secretary of Labor to investigate and make specific recommendations concerning age 
discrimination in employment. The report, The Older American Worker-Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment, submitted June 30, 1965, documented widespread age discrimination. 
The ADEA was passed December 6, 1%7. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 
reprinted in (1967) U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2213, 2214. 
118 The court in Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 445 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 
1972), noted, "With a few minor exceptions the prohibitions of this enactment are in terms 
identical to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been 
substituted for 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Accord, Morelock v. NCR 
Corp., 14 FEP Cases (BNA) 65- 68 (6th Cir. 1976); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 
620 (D. Kan. 1973). 
119 See, e.g., Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975), Burgett v. 
Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973), and Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 62 
WINTER 1977) Implications of National League 
V. THE EFFECT OF THE HOLDING IN NATIONAL LEAGUE 
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EPA 
AND THE ADEA TO THE STATES 
A. Remaining Validity under the Commerce Clause 
261 
The decision in National League invalidated the minimum wage 
and maximum hours provisions of the 1974 FLSA Amendments 
insofar as they interfered with essential state functions. While 
National League does not seem to limit the FLSA, the EPA, and 
the ADEA where nonessential or nontraditional governmental ac-
tivities are involved, it is not clear how the decision will affect the 
application of the EPA and the AD EA to essential state functions. 
The Court did not discuss either the EPA or the ADEA, 120 and it is 
submitted here that, unlike the FLSA wage-hour regulations in-
volved in National League, the extension of the EPA and the 
ADEA to essential state functions should not be invalidated under 
the National League rationale. 
F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (cases construing the provision requiring notice of intent to sue, 
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970) of ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(t) (Supp. V 1975) of Title 
VII). Courts have also used Title VII precedents to construe the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) exception of the ADEA. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 
224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 449 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Concerning the right to a jury trial in ADEA cases, see 
Morelock v. NCR Corp., 14 FEP Cases (BNA) 65 (6th Cir. 1976). The burden of proof 
established in Title VII actions is also used widely in ADEA actions. Hodgson v. First Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Bisl}op v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579 
(D.D.C. 1974). Cf. Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975) (unwilling to 
apply Title VII burden of proof automatically to ADEA jury trial). 
The ADEA and Title VII have been similarly construed. See Levien, The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 OUQ. L. 
REv. 227, 247 (1974); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 
II CoLVM. J. LAW & Soc. PRoB. 281,289, 295-96, 301-03, 308 (1975); Note, Procedural 
Aspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 914,922; 
926-27 (1975); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally 
Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 I, 1328 (1974). 
In several respects the ADEA is a more limited remedial statute than Title VII. It has 
more liberal bona fide seniority and merit exceptions, 29 U .S.C. § 623(t) (1970), and it 
applies only to persons in the 40-65 age group, 29 U .S.C. § 631 (Supp. V 1975). See Weiss v. 
Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afj'd mem., 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: The Problem of the 
Worker Over Sixty-Five, 5 RITT.-CAM. L.J. 484 (1974). While the purpose of the ADEA is 
generally viewed as similar to that of Title VII, some courts have differentiated the two acts 
by giving the procedural aspects of the ADEA a less liberal construction. See, e.g., Edwards 
v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d I 195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L._ REv. 380 
(1976); Note, State Deferral of Complaints Under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 51° NOTRE DAME LAW. 492 (1976) [hereinafter cited as State Deferral of Complaints]. 
120 The appellants broadly framed their challenge to include the EPA and ADEA, but the 
issues presented by these acts were never argued. The opinion of the three-judge district 
court also did not mention the EPA and the ADEA. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 
406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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Several federal district courts have considered the question 
whether National League restricts federal power to require state 
compliance with the EPA121 and the ADEA. 122 These courts have 
uniformly upheld the constitutionality of applying these acts to 
state employees, either as independent assertions of the federal 
commerce power, severable from the wage-hour regulations of 
FLSA, 123 or as valid congressional implementations of the four-
teenth amendment. 124 These cases have involved hospitals, uni-
versities, or school districts, all of which are expressly immunized 
from FLSA wage-hour regulations under the essential state func-
tion test of National League .125 
The National League opinion suggests that the sovereign state 
rights it protects may ·be narrowly defined: 
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' 
power to determine the wages which shall be p_aid to those 
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental 
functions, what hours those persons will work, and what com-
pensation will be provided where these employees may be 
called upon to work overtime. The question we must resolve, 
then, is whether these determinations are•"functions essential 
to separate and independent existence," ... so that Congress 
may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority to 
make them. 126 
It is not entirely clear whether the National League decision pro-
tects the states from federal regulation where they are engaged in 
delivering essential services or where they are determining wage 
rates and hourly schedules in state employment. It appears to 
121 Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 1188 (3d Cir. 1976); 
Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 45 U.S.L.W. 2351 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1977); Usery v. 
Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976); 
Usery v. University of Texas at El Paso, 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1388 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 
1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., 22 WH Cases 
(BNA) 1373 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Fort Madison 
Community School Dist., No. C-75-62-1 (S.D. Iowa Sept. I, 1976) (motion to dismiss 
denied); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 634 (S.D. Iowa 
Sept. 1, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., No. 
76-249 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Sioux City Community 
School Dist., No. C-76-4024 (N .0. Iowa Aug. 20, 1976)(motion to dismiss denied); Christen-
sen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 161 (N .0. Iowa Aug. 4, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied). 
122 Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEPCases(BNA) 717 (0. Utah Sept. 1, 
1976); Riley v. University of Lowell, Civ. No. 76-1118-M (0. Mass, July 22, 1976)(motion to 
dismiss denied). 
123The severability provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970) provides: "If any 
provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance 
is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and the application of such provision to other 
persons or circumstances shall not be aflected thereby." 
124 See part V. B. infra. 
125 426 U.S. at 855. 
126 Id. at 845-46. 
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immunize certain employment decisions, such as wages and hours, 
within certain state functions characterized as essential or tradi-
tional. The Court relies only upon examples of the disruptive effect 
of federal wage-hour regulation in reaching the conclusion that the 
FLSA Amendments impose a substantial fiscal burden and dis-
place state employment decisions. 127 The opinion did not consider 
whether employment discrimination in essential state functions is a 
sovereign right included within the Court's immunization of "ac-
cepted employment practices" 128 or "considered policy 
choices" 129 of the states. 130 
If National League is viewed as creating an ad hoc balancing 
test, in which the degree of federal intrusion and the federal policy 
implemented by the regulation are weighed against the state inter-
est involved,131 the particular balance struck in National League 
between wage-hour regulations and states' fiscal and governmental 
integrity may be distinguished from the balance implicated in the 
application of EPA and ADEA to the states. 132 Even if these acts 
are potentially disruptive of state sovereignty under the National 
League rationale, the degree of interference and the particular 
interests involved should shift the balance in favor of upholding 
their applicability to the states. 133 
127 Id. at 845-52. 
128 Id. at 850. 
12
• Id. at 848. 
130 In Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 161. 163 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 4, 1976), the 
court stated that sex discrimination should not be included within any of the court's 
formulations of immunized state activities because the right to discriminate is not a "funda-
mental employment decision," an "attribute of sovereignty," or a "function essential to 
separate and independent existence of the states." See Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 
45 U.S.L.W. 2351, 2352 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1977); Usery v. University of Texas at El Paso, 22 
WH Cases (BNA) 1388, 1389 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf Community 
School Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 634. 635 (S.D. Iowa Sept. I, 1976). The court in Usery v. 
Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377, 1377-79 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 
1976), stressed the independent integrity of the EPA, the fact that it was passed separately 
and was based on a distinct legislative history, and the fact that the FLSA provides for the 
severability of its provisions, concluding that the state actions protected by National 
League are limited to "internal, administrative, management or housekeeping functions," 
such as wage-hour decisions. Id. at 1379. See Usery v. Allegheny County, 13 FEP Cases 
(BNA) at 2252. 
131 See part III. B. supra. 
132 The failure of the majority opinion to expressly adopt a balancing approach leaves 
obscure the question of what standards would be used if it did. The only guide to predicting 
what types of federal regulation could override state sovereign immunity is the Court's 
analysis of Fry and its subsequent decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), 
discussed at notes 144-48 and accompanying text infra. 
133 See, e.g., Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377, 
1379-80 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976), where the court suggested that a substantial federal 
intrusion is required to justify tenth amendment immunity and that the state interest may be 
overridden by a strong federal interest. The EPA's interference with the sovereignty of a 
state employer is justified under the balancing process suggested by the National League 
endorsement of Fry, 426 U.S. at 852-53, and by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, 426 
U.S. at 856. The court in Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, I 3 FEP Cases (BNA) 
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Although linked to the FLSA to facilitate enforcement, the EPA 
and the ADEA were enacted separately from the FLSA and were 
based upon independent congressional assessments of the adverse 
impact of sex and age discrimination in employment. The EPA and 
the ADEA reflect a strong federal policy against employment dis-
crimination, analogous to the policy pursued in Title VIl. 134 These 
acts should not be included in the National League invalidation of 
the FLSA Amendments, especially in view of the absence of any 
specific reference to them by the Court and the differing federal 
interests involved. 135 The impact on state budgetary priorities is 
less severe with the EPA and the ADEA than with the FLSA 
requirements of a floor on all wages paid and a minimum rate for 
overtime. These acts do not require a restructuring of "work 
patterns" in the sense used in the National League opinion. The 
references in the opinion to the protected state right to "structure" 
employment relations are illustrated by examples of the conflict 
between FLSA wage-hour regulations and various local alterna-
tives to the minimum wage and premium overtime. The effect of 
federal preemption of state decisions in this area is either to impose 
a substantial economic burden on state governments or to force 
relinquishment of important governmental activities. The purpose 
and effect of the EPA and the ADEA are distinguishable under this 
rationale. These acts require only that the terms and conditions of 
employment chosen by the states be extended equally to all 
employees regardless of age or sex. 136 Like the wage controls 
717, 718 (D. Utah Sept. 1, 1976), similarly construed National League to require a balancing 
approach permitting the significant federal interest incorporated in the ADEA to override a 
state claim of immunity. An "absolute interpretation" which insulates essential state func-
tions from any federal intrusion would undermine congressional power to protect statutorily 
individual employment rights. 
134 See part IV. supra. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
41 I U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1%8); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th 
Cir. 1971); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 991 (1971); Shultz v.'Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 905 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-24, 
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2355, 2362-77; Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprinted in [1972] 
U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws. 2137, 2139-41, 2152-54. 
135 See Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377, 1378 (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 19, 1976), where the court stated: "While National League of Cities does effect a 
modest resurrection of state sovereignty, this court doubts in the absence of any further 
indication from the Supreme Court, that National League of Cities is intended to generally 
and fundamentally alter the balance of state and federal powers." 
136 The court in Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 717, 719 
(D. Utah Sept. I, 1976), argued that the "minimal" degree of intrusion involved in com-
pliance with the ADEA is a factor in the balancing process. The ADEA "imposes a limited 
negative obligation on the state employer not to arbitrarily use age as an employment 
criterion, however the remaining criteria may be structured, rather than an affirmative 
obligation to totally restructure an integral state operation." Id. at 719. It also distinguished 
the ADEA from wage-hour regulations as merely an "indirect" intrusion, not a direct 
displacement of state employment relations prohibited under National League. Id. 
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upheld in Fry, the fiscal burden, the interference with the state 
prerogative to determine employment relations, and the federal 
policy implicated in the EPA and the ADEA distinguish these acts 
from the wage-hour regulations invalidated in National League. 
The decision's rationale supporting state freedom to fashion flexi-
ble alternatives to the wage-hour structure of FLSA does not 
justify discretion at the state or local level to discriminate in public 
employment on the basis of age or sex. 137 
While the EPA and the ADEA are distinguishable from the 
wage-hour regulations specifically invalidated in National League, 
the majority's sweeping rationale has disturbing implications. Even 
if the National League decision cannot be read to invalidate the 
application of these acts to state employees, a more difficult ques-
tion is whether the construction given the tenth amendment by the 
majority will be applied in other contexts to limit the reach of 
federal legislation. If the tenth amendment functions as an affirma-
tive limitation on federal regulations which disrupt either state 
fiscal determinations or state policy choices, the theory of Na-
tional League could logically be developed to reach a wide range of 
federal legislation. In fact, the Court's rationale could even be 
applied to the EPA and the ADEA though their antidiscrimination 
standards arguably intrude less on the states' prerogative to struc-
ture employment relations than the wage-hour provisions of the 
FLSA. The difficulty with the National League decision is that it 
fails to adequately- analyze the nature or degree of constitutionally 
137 The appellant cities and states in National League made only one reference to the 
ADEA in their brief. Citing ADEA § 633(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970), they suggested that 
this provision explicitly recognizes the desirability of federal-state cooperation in age dis-
crimination cases. Brief for Appellant National League at 75-76, National League, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976). Section 633 provides: 
(a) Federal action superseding State action. 
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State 
performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on 
account of age except that upon commencement of action under this chapter such 
action shall supersede any State action. 
(b) Limitation of Federal action upon commencement of State proceedings. 
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law 
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or au-
thorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, 
no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty 
days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such 
proceedings have been earlier terminated .... 
Some courts have interpreted § 633 as a mandatory requirement of deferral to available state 
remedies. Gogerv. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 
382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974). This result is not based on the view that age discrimina-
tion is peculiarly within the competence of the states or that the federal act infringes upon 
state sovereignty, but rather upon an analogy between§ 633(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) 
(Supp. V 1975) of Title VII. See Note, State Deferral of Complaints, supra note I I 9. Title 
VII does not have a literal counterpart to§ 633(a). Although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970) is 
similar, the ADEA provision more explicitly provides for federal preemption of state laws. 
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impermissible intrusion and it fails to expressly adopt a balancing 
approach for resolving conflicting state and federal interests. 
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
A number of courts have suggested that an alternative ground for 
sustaining the application of the EPA and the ADEA to the states is 
the congressional power to enact appropriate enabling legislation 
to guarantee equal protection of the laws pursuant to section 5 of 
the fourteenth amendment. 138 Because National League .applied 
the tenth amendment limitation only to legislation enacted pur-
suant to the commerce clause, it is suggested that the EPA and the 
ADEA continue to be fully enforceable against the states because 
they instead are supported by the grant of power to Congress in 
section 5. This argument is based upon an analogy between these 
acts and Title VII and upon the fact that congressional reliance on 
section 5 to extend Title VII to state employers has been held to 
foreclose state claims to sovereign immunity under the eleventh 
amendment. 139 
The fourteenth amendment restructured federal-state relations 
by direct restrictions on state power and by a specific grant of 
authority to Congress to enforce its prohibitions by appropriate 
legislation .140 This delegation of federal power has been inter-
preted as vesting in Congress a broad choice of means to effectuate 
the purposes and policies of the amendment. Legislation enacted 
pursuant to section 5 enjoys a presumption of validity so that 
Congress' resolution of competing federal, state, and individual 
interests is valid if there is a rational basis for it. 141 
138 Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 1188 (3d Cir. 1976); 
·Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 45 U.S.L.W. 2351 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1977); Usery v. 
Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377 (N .D. Tex .. Oct. 19, 1976); 
Usery v. Washoe County School Dist. 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1373 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 1976); 
Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 634 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 
1976); Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 717 (D. Utah Sept. 
1, 1976). 
139 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, but the 
legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 
% Stat. 103 (1972), which extended the coverage of the Civil Rights Act to state and local 
governments, expressly relied upon the congressional power granted in the enabling clauses 
of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 
reprinted in [1972) U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 2137, 2154. Because it does not depend 
solely on the commerce power, the extension of Title VII is unaffected by National 
League's tenth amendment analysis. 
14° Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,% S. Ct. 2666 (1976); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 
(1972); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
345-46, 348 (1879). See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), interpreting the 
effect of the fifteenth amendment on state sovereignty: "When a State exercises power 
wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But 
-such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumvent-
ing a federally protected right." Id. at 347. 
141 In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the scope of section 5 was given a 
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972142 extended the 
coverage of Title VII to state and local governments two years 
before the FLSA was amended to reach state employers. Although 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted pursuant to the commerce 
clause and reached the private sector, the 1972 Act was expressly 
based upon the congressional power to implement the thirteenth 
and fourteenth amendments .143 
The Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 144 upheld congressional power 
under section 5 to authorize a private right of action and monetary 
damages for sex discrimination against a state employer under the 
1972 Amendments to Title VII. In an opinion written by Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the eleventh amendment does not 
preclude a backpay award, because the principle of sovereignty 
embodied in that amendment is "necessarily limited" 145 by the 
enforcement provisions of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 
The Court's rationale was based upon a liberal interpretation of the 
power of Congress to intrude on state sovereignty when acting 
pursuant to section 5, and it appears to be equally valid in restrict-
ing state claims to immunity under the tenth amendment. The 
Fitzpatrick Court did not consider whether Title VII is a legitimate 
exercise of congressional authority under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment, 146 noting, however, that Congress may, "in 
construction similar to the broad interpretation given the necessary and proper clause in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 384 U.S. at 650. Section 5 is a 
"positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in 
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 651. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 141-43 (1970) 
(Douglas,{, dissenting and concurring), 248-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring); 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring), 782-84 (Brennan, 
J., concurring); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). See also the liberal construction 
of section 2 of the fifteenth amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
324-27 (1966). 
142 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e-2000e-15 (1970)). The constitutionality of this extension in coverage was upheld 
against a state challenge based on the eleventh amendment immunity to suit in Fitzpatrick v; 
Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976). See notes 144-48 and accompanying text infra. See Singer v. 
Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retard., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 10,287 (6th Cir. 
1975); Gilliam v. Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975); Henry V. Link, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) ,r 10,992 (D.N.D. March 16, 1976); United States v. Milwaukee, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) ,r 10,385 (E.D. Wis. June 25, 1975). 
143 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 19, reprinted in [1972) U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 2137, 2154, states: 
The expansion of Title VII coverage to State and local government employment is 
firmly embodied in the principles of the Constitution of the United States. The 
Constitution has recognized that it is inimical to the democratic form of government 
to allow the existence of discrimination in those bureaucratic systems which most 
directly affect the daily interactions of this Nation's citizens. The clear intention of 
the Constitution, embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, is to 
prohibit all forms of discrimination. 
144 96 s·. Ct. 2666 (1976). 
145 Id. at 2671. 
146 Id. at 2671 n.11. The district court's finding that the state violated Title VII was not 
appealed. The Court was presented only with the eleventh amendment issue as to the 
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determining what is. 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of 
enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for 
private suits against States or state officials which are constitution-
ally impermissible in other contexts." 147 According to the Fitzpat-
rick Court, the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment 
were specifically intended to restrict state powers with section 5 
expressly authorizing congressional action to enforce. its terms. 
Distinguishing National League, the Court stated that congres-
sional authority is broader under the fourteenth amendment than 
under the commerce clause and is not similarly restricted by state 
sovereign immunity .148 
The Court in Fitzpatrick suggested that when Congress seeks to 
protect federally-created rights by directly regulating state actions, 
as distinct from displacing the states' ability to regulate private 
parties, section 5 may furnish a stronger constitutional basis for 
congressional power than the commerce clause. 149 Nevertheless, 
the scope of congressional power to define and to remedy substan-
tive violations of the fourteenth amendment as well as to preempt 
appropriate remedy and not with the question as to whether the application of Title VII to 
the states violates the tenth amendment. The Court stated, % S. Ct. at 2670 n.9, that the 1972 
Amendments to Title VII were unquestionably an exercise of congressional power under 
section 5 with the practical effect of the decision being to grant full relief on the Title VII 
cause of action. 
147 Id. at 2671. 
148 The Court relied upon Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), in support of 
its view that the fourteenth amendment altered federal-state relations, expanding the one 
and necessarily contracting the other. 96 S. Ct. at 2671. In separate concurring opinions, 
Justices Brennan and Stevens both expressed the view that the commerce clause is broad 
enough to sustain Title VII rights and remedies without express reliance on section 5. Id. at 
2672 (Brennan, J., concurring), at 2672-73 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
149 The Court in National League declined to consider whether legislation pursuant to 
section 5 is subject to the tenth amendment limitation. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The Fitzpatrick 
opinion does not offer a satisfactory constitutional explanation for the significant distinction 
between the plenary scope of congressional power under section 5 and the more limited 
scope of the commerce clause. With respect to the private sector, the commerce clause has 
provided a more effective basis for legislation prohibiting discrimination because it avoids 
the state action requirement-of the fourteenth amendment. The landmark cases .upholding 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relied upon the commerce clause without reaching the 
question whether section 5 presented an alternative ground. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
See also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 as a valid commerce regulation. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the public 
accommodations provision was invalid under the commerce clause but could be upheld, in 
his view, if Congress had relied upon section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 395 U.S. at 309 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens, concurring separately in Fitzpatrick, argued that Title VII is more 
properly justified by tha commerce power, rather than the fourteenth amendment, despite 
specific congressional reliance on section 5: 
[I] do not believe plaintiffs proved a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
because I am not sure that the 1972 Amendments were "needed to secure the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," see Katzenbach v. Morgan, ... I 
question whether section 5 of that Amendment is an adequate reply to Connec-
ticut's Eleventh Amendment defense. 
96 S. Ct. at 2672. 
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existing state laws, absent a judicial determination that certain 
conduct violates that amendment, has not been completely 
resolved by the Court. 150 While it has been held that congressional 
enactments pursuant to section 5 will be subject to only limited 
judicial review to determine a rational basis for the legislation, 151 
this deference to the legislative judgment presumes that Congress 
actually decided that the legislation was, in its view, necessary to 
secure the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. The most 
serious weakness of the argument that section 5 provides an alter-
native ground for sustainin_g the EPA and the ADEA is that Con-
150 See generally Cohen, supra note 44; Cox, The Role of Congress in -Constitutional 
Determinations, 40 U. C1N. L. REV. 199 (1971); Fiss, The Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 
U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1974); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). 
A majority of the Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), concluded that 
Congress had power under section 5 to prohibit all conspiracies to interfere with fourteenth 
amendment rights, with or without state action. Id. at 745, 761-62 (Clark, J., concurring), at 
782-84 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that section 5 is a 
"positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in 
fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens." Id. at 784. The 
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 382 U.S. 641 (1966), held that Congress could displace an 
inconsistent state law by appropriate legislation to enforce the equal protection clause, 
absent a prior judicial determination that the precluded state law actually violated the 
amendment. Section 5 authorizes Congress to employ any means appropriately adapted to 
implement the fourteenth amendment and it will be sustained on review if the judiciary can 
perceive a rational basis for it. Id. at 650-53. For a similar analysis of section 2 of the 
fifteenth amendment, see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966). 
But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), where a majority of the Court held that 
Congress had no power under the fourteenth amendment to lower the voting age in state 
elections because qualifications for voting are expressly reserved to the states. There are 
five separate opinions in Oregon, and it is difficult to say to what extent the case narrows 
Morgan's construction of congressional power to legislate in the area of equal protection. In 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), 
enacted pursuant to section 5. The Court stated that Congress intended to fundamentally 
alter the relations between the states and the national government with the result that 
Congress' role as a guarantor of federally-cri:ated rights against state power was clearly 
established. 407 U.S. at 238-42. 
In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that the standards applicable 
to Title VII cases should not be applied to determine whether allegedly racially discrimina-
tory employment testing violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Statutory 
causes of action involve a different burden of proof and a "more probing judicial review of, 
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts" of government officials. 426 U.S. at 
247. The case clearly recognizes that Congress can statutorily define more. rigid standards in 
prohibiting employment discrimination than would a court applying traditional equal protec-
tion review. Congress, acting through Title VII, could create a cause of action and a remedy 
for violation of a constitutionally-protected right where none had previously existed. Cf. 
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (Dec. 7, 1976), holding that a private 
employer's disability plan which excluded pregnancy-related benefits did not violate Title 
VII. The majority opinion suggests that the legislative standard of Title VII may be con-
strued by reference to judicial interpretations of the equal protection clause, in particular the 
decision upholding exclusion of pregnancy benefits in a state-operated disability plan, 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 45 U.S.L.W. at 4033, 4034. The General Electric 
decision did not displace a specific congressional determination that this type of disability 
plan violates equal protection. Rather, it overruled the administrative interpretation of the 
relevant Title VII provision and construed the Act by relying on the judicial interpretation in 
Aiello that exclusion of pregnancy benefits does not create a sex-based classification. 
151 See notes 140-41 and accompanying text & note 149 supra. 
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gress did not expressly rely on section 5 in extending the coverage 
of these acts to the states. 
Originally intended only to reach the private sector and linked to 
the coverage of the FLSA, the acts were extended to the states by 
the 1974 FLSA Amendments152 which relied on the connection 
between state governmental activities and interstate commerce. 
Although the federal district courts which have sustained the EPA 
and the ADEA on section 5 grounds have not been troubled by the 
failure of Congress to expressly rely on that source of power, 153 
there is no reason to assume that the Court will necessarily infer a 
congressional intention to invoke section 5. Moreover, the Na-
tional League decision reflects an activist judicial attitude toward 
the role of the Supreme Court in displacing legislative judgments 
on the question of federal-state relations. While the Fitzpatrick 
court stated that the federal power involved was the crucial factor 
in its decision to override eleventh amendment immunity, there is 
no suggestion that the same result would be reached if Congress 
had not expressly relied on section 5. Furthermore, in the absence 
of an applicable congressional enactment implementing the four-
teenth amendment, judicial review of equal protection does not 
subject sex and age discrimination to strict scrutiny .154 
152 Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974). 
153 In Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 1188, 1193 (3d Cir. 
1976), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. concluding that section 5 provided a "clear 
constitutionaljusitification" for the EPA, refused to be limited by congressional reliance on 
the commerce power. "In exercising the power of judicial review, as distinguished from the 
duty of statutory interpretation, we are concerned with the actual powers of the national 
government." Id. at 1193-94. The severable EPA statute, which may be justified under 
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, is not invalid as applied to the states simply because 
it is located in a section of the Code enacted pursuant to the commerce clause. Similarly, in 
Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377. 1378-79 (N.D. Tex. 
Oct. 19, 1976). the court ruled that the defendant employer has the burden of establishing 
that there is no plausible constitutional basis for sustaining a presumptively valid federal 
statute. Despite specific congressional reliance on the commerce power, the court found 
that the EPA was "easily sustained" under the fourteenth amendment. The court in Usery 
v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 717, 719-20 (D. Utah Sept. 1, 
1976), argued that Congress had not clearly defined the constitutional foundation for the 
ADEA and, on the basis of an analogy to Title VII, it concluded that the legislation was 
supportable under either the commerce clause or the fourteenth amendment. In Brown v. 
County of Santa Barbara, 45 U.S.L.W. 2351, 2352 (C.D. Cal. Jan.14.1977), the court held 
that the express reliance by Congress on the commerce clause did not preclude application 
of the fourteenth amendment as a supportable ground for the EPA because the state had not 
established that Congress intended to exclude other applicable bases. 
154 For cases interpreting the sex classification, see Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), upheld 
Title VII' s statutory remedy for sex discrimination in employment against a state employer. 
For cases interpreting the age classification, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N .Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 
461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973). 
The Weiss Court, refusing to hold that age ceilings upon eligibility for employment are 
inherently suspect, discussed the somewhat unique nature of age classifications: 
(T]he absence of specific reference to age in the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
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If the argument that section 5 provides constitutional authority 
for the EPA and the ADEA has any validity at all, it must rest on an 
analogy between these acts and Title VIl 155 and on the inference 
that Congress regarded violations of these statutes as a denial of 
equal protection to trigger the exercise of section 5 powers by 
Congress. These three acts represent a federal policy against dis-
crimination in employment, and, as implemented in Title VII, this 
policy overrides state claims to immunity .156 The I 972 Amend-
ments to Title VII announced a congressional intention to imple-
ment a national policy against discrimination in state and local 
governments by providing governmental employees with effective 
remedies equivalent to those afforded private employees. 157 Both 
alone insulate age classifications from constitutional scrutiny any more than does 
the absence of mention of poverty or residency for example .... But being a 
classification that cuts fully across racial, religious, and economic lines, and one 
that generally bears some relation to mental and physical capacity, age is less likely 
to be an invidious distinction. 
324 F. Supp. at 77. The per curiam decision in Murgia applied a rational basis standard to 
evaluate a challenge that compulsory retirement of state police officers at age 50 violates 
equal protection. The classification established by the state statute did not separate a 
historically disadvantaged class or a discrete and insular group, nor did it infringe upon a 
fundamental right. In finding that the classification rationally furthered legitimate state 
purposes, the Court acknowledged that "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is 
peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one." 427 U.S. at 314. The Court in Murgia 
made no claim under the ADEA, and the Court held only that the state statute does not deny 
equal protection of the laws. It is not clear whether the Court would defer to the congres-
sional judgment incorporated in the ADEA that lines drawn between the ages of 40 and 65 
impermissibly burden interstate commerce when that judgment collides with a state policy 
requiring early retirement for policemen performing essential state functions. 
155 See notes 107-12, 117-19 and accompanying text supra. 
156 See note 134 supra. One aspect of the relationship between the policies implemented 
by Title VII and state sovereignty is the controversy over the discriminatory effect of state 
"protective" legislation. Many state laws provide protective regulations which are applica-
ble only to women including laws governing minimum wages and maximum hours. The issue 
is whether such state legislation establishes a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ 
exception within § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970)), and thus an affirma-
tive defense for the employer, or whether the state laws conflict with the Title VII policy of 
requiring employers to hire on the basis of individual abilities. The trend has been toward a 
recognition that the federal policy of the Civil Rights Act is paramount to any state right to 
make this type of employment decision. State legislation will not be allowed to define and 
limit federally-created rights. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 71 I (7th Cir. 
1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1%9); Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 
1971 ); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm 'n Guidelines interpreting Title VII, 29 C .F. R. 
§ 1604.2(b)(I) (1975)-state protective legislation discriminates on the basis of sex, conflicts 
with Title VII, and is not a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment 
practice under Title VII; Wage and Hour Guidelines interpreting the EPA, 29 C.F.R. § 
800.163 (1975)-legal restrictions in state or other laws will not operate to make otherwise 
equal work unequal or to justify a prohibited wage differential; Durant, The Validity of State 
Protective Legislation for Women in Light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6 
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 33 (1971); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, I 186-95 (1971). 
157 The House Report states: 
The problem of employment discrimination is particularly acute and has the most 
deleterious effect in these governmental activities which are most visible to the 
minority communities (notably education, la\V enforcement, and the administration 
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the EPA 158 and the ADEA 159 are supported by substantial legisla-
tive findings of widespread and arbitrary discrimination in 
employment. The parallel is most persuasive with respect to the 
EPA because a denial of equal pay for equal work is also a cogniz-
able violation of Title VII. Similarly, in many cases, the two acts 
provide alternative remedies. 160 
If the EPA and the ADEA are sustainable under Congress' 
section 5 power, then the constitutionality of the intrusion on state 
sovereignty may be resolved• by the rational basis approach used 
for section 5 analysis. 161 Utilization of this approach might provide 
more consistent validation of federally-protected rights than would 
a construction of National League to require a balancing of the 
federal and state interests involved. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The impact of National League on the continued effectiveness of 
the EPA and ADEA, as applied to state and local government 
of justice) with the result that the credibility of the government's claim to represent 
all the people equally is negated. 
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in (1972] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. 
NEWS 2137, 2153. The examples cited by Congress as involving particularly egregious state 
discrimination would qualify as essential state functions under the National League test. 
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-47 (1974); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 
(1976). 
158 S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess., reprinted in (1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687; The Equa"t Pay Act: Hearings 
on H.R. 3861 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and 
Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); The Equal Pay Act: Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See Berger, supra note 104. 
159 S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., Isl Sess., reprinted in (1967] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. 
NEWS 2213; H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong .• 1st Sess. (1967); Age Discrimination in 
Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the 
Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on 
Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); U.S. DEP'T. 
OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER 
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965). 
160 See, e.g., Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1373 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 14, 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 161 (N .D. Iowa Aug. 4, 1976). See 
Berger, supra note 104. 
161 The Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), stated: 
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the 
various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination 
in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on 
the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of 
alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that 
would be affected.· ... It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of 
these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the 
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. 
Id. at 653. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-37 (1966); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-45 (1961). 
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employers, is unclear because the scope of the National League 
holding is difficult to ascertain. The FLSA, including the EPA, and 
the ADEA remain fully enforceable against state operations found 
to be nonessential or nontraditional. The EPA and the ADEA may 
be enforceable even as to essential government functions on the 
ground that the National League Court did not intend to include 
freedom to violate these statutes in the states' sovereign right to 
structure employment relations. Even if freedom to violate these 
statutes is a protected sovereign decision, the state interest served 
is outweighed by the federal antidiscrimination interest involved 
combined with the less severe degree of intrusion. Further, even if 
treated as invalid exercises of the commerce clause under the 
National League analysis, the EPA and the ADEA, as applied to 
state and local governments, may be sustainable as enabling legis-
lation enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 
Therefore, despite the uncertainty about the implications of the 
National League rationale, the decision should not be interpreted 
as invalidating the application of the EPA and the ADEA to state 
and local governments. 
-Ellen B. Spellman 
